Responding to the terror attack in Pahalgam


The terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir is not just an act of brutality; it is a calculated political signal, carefully timed and deliberately chosen to inflict not only human casualties, but cause strategic disruption. Coming days after the Kashmir Valley had begun welcoming tourists as part of a fresh season, and while U.S. Vice-President J.D. Vance tours India, this is not a random or desperate strike. It seems to be the continuation of a long-standing pattern of cross-border terrorism, directed and sustained by the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment. At a time when Pakistan had faded from India’s diplomatic radar and foreign policy imagination, it is back: threatening to disrupt much of what we hold dear.

The attack took place in Baisaran, an alpine meadow which is often described as ‘mini Switzerland’. The very setting — a site of picnics, pony rides, and often school excursions — make the images all the more harrowing. Videos of terrified tourists scrambling for safety, and bloodstained trails in a place known for its serenity, have left an indelible mark on public memory. It was not just a strike on innocent tourists; it was a deliberate assault on the idea of Kashmir as a safe and even sacred tourist space.

Editorial | Unity and resolve: On the Pahalgam terror attack

It also reflects a massive intelligence failure, and a lowering of the security vigil, which is deeply troubling. Pahalgam is a tourist hub; a gateway to the Amarnath shrine. The forces and agencies should have been on their guard. The drones and electronic surveillance infrastructure that India has invested in also seems to have been absent. While the intelligence failure may appear to not have been as colossal as it was in Kargil, it will have as deep a societal impact.

The responsibility for the Pahalgam attack has been claimed by The Resistance Front, a proxy outfit with clear operational links to the Lashkar-e-Taiba — deeply embedded within the network of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The pattern is now familiar: inflict pain on India, sow uncertainty in Kashmir, and provoke reaction — all while maintaining a thin veneer of deniability. That such operations continue despite decades of global scrutiny reveals the strategic environment in which they thrive. It is one in which Pakistan has too often acted without paying a proportionate cost. That must change.

Crafting a response

If India is to meaningfully alter the calculus in Rawalpindi, it must also develop the institutional memory and policy continuity to respond across political administrations. Terrorism cannot be treated episodically. A long-term approach to deterrence must involve political consensus, sustained intelligence capability, and the diplomatic stamina to persist with pressure even in the absence of major attacks. Strategic patience, not short bursts of retaliatory energy, is what Pakistan’s playbook is least equipped to handle.

India’s response to the Pahalgam massacre must be rooted not just in outrage, but in strategy. Condemnation is necessary but insufficient. The imperative now is deterrence — not in the abstract, but as policy. Deterrence, in classical strategic theory, is not the threat of punishment alone. It is the imposition of credible, visible, and cumulative costs that alter the behaviour of the adversary over time.

The difficulty, of course, lies in crafting a response that deters without destabilising. But India’s continued restraint — save notable exceptions such as responses after the terrorist attacks in Uri and Pulwama — in the face of repeated provocations has often been interpreted in Rawalpindi as hesitation and even weakness. To alter that perception, we must embrace a framework of escalatory credibility — not escalation for its own sake, but the ability and willingness to impose pain through diplomatic, economic, and covert means when red lines are crossed.

This includes sustained efforts to diplomatically isolate Pakistan on platforms where it seeks legitimacy; the careful reconsideration of trade and water-sharing mechanisms that Pakistan depends on; and the expansion of covert and intelligence-based capabilities to disrupt terrorist infrastructure across the Line of Control (LoC). These options are neither reckless nor novel. They are tools of statecraft that have been successfully used by others — including by those who lecture India on proportionality.

Instability in Pakistan

To understand why Pakistan resorts to such acts, we must look at the internal dynamics of the state. Pakistan today is deeply unstable. It is economically paralysed, politically rudderless, and socially fraying. In this context, adventurism in Kashmir becomes a political instrument — a way for the military establishment to reassert authority and deflect domestic discontent.

Unlike his predecessor, the quietly pragmatic General Qamar Javed Bajwa, the current Army Chief, General Asim Munir, known for his aggressive posture and appetite for risk, appears to be reviving the doctrine of ‘managed escalation’ — a strategy that sees value in carefully calibrated acts of violence under the nuclear threshold. A former ISI chief and deeply embedded within Pakistan’s military-intelligence nexus, Mr. Munir has revived a rhetoric that blends ideological grievance with strategic opportunism. His frequent references to Hindu-Muslim relations in Manichean terms and his recent description of Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular vein” reinforces the ‘old’ doctrine that sees Kashmir as a perpetual battleground and not as a site for peace. The recent escalation in ceasefire violations across the LOC, in violation of the ceasefire ‘agreement’ in operation since February 2021, is further evidence of the reckless approach being pursued by him.

This is not without precedent. Each phase of heightened internal unrest or civil-military imbalance in Pakistan has historically coincided with escalatory behaviour towards India — and Kashmir has been the primary theatre. The Kargil conflict in 1999, launched under the leadership of General Pervez Musharraf during Nawaz Sharif’s civilian government, remains a stark example of the military’s willingness to bypass its own civilian leadership to provoke confrontation. The Parliament attack in 2001, the Mumbai attacks in 2008, the Uri attack in 2016, and the Pulwama suicide bombing in 2019 — all bear the hallmarks of a strategy designed to trigger a response from India while keeping Pakistan’s involvement deniable. These incidents were not isolated acts of terrorism; they were episodes in a sustained campaign of asymmetric warfare.

Re-establishing deterrence

This is why deterrence must be re-established. India cannot afford to allow its adversary to believe that it can continue with such attacks without serious consequences. This is not merely a matter of honour or public expectation; it is one of long-term strategic stability.

The choice of targets in Pahalgam is telling. Tourism has become a symbol of tentative recovery in Kashmir. It offers livelihoods to ordinary Kashmiris and represents the reweaving of ties between the Valley and the rest of the country. Attacking tourists, therefore, is not only an act of terror, but an attempt to sabotage the very idea of normalcy. To cut off the Valley from its visitors is to deepen the isolation that terrorist groups rely on.

It is important to say this clearly: the people of Kashmir are not complicit in this violence. On the contrary, they are its first victims. The younger generation in the Valley is looking for opportunity, not militancy. They want better education, better jobs, and a future beyond conflict. The narrative that Kashmiris harbour sympathy for terrorists is both factually wrong and strategically dangerous. It alienates the very population whose inclusion is essential to any durable peace. India’s internal response, then, must be as resolute as its external one — but not in the language of repression. Instead, it must be expressed through sustained economic investment, political engagement, and continued efforts at social integration. This is not only the right thing to do, but also the strategically smart thing to do.

The timing of Mr. Vance’s visit to India offers a moment of diplomatic opportunity. Washington understands the long shadow that state-sponsored terrorism casts over democracies. India must press for clearer public language from the U.S. and its allies, and for sustained pressure on Pakistan’s support networks. Sympathy after attacks is welcome; action before them is what matters more.

There are no easy solutions. But clarity must precede action. The Pahalgam massacre is not simply another tragedy to be absorbed into the long ledger of terror. It is a reminder that ambiguity emboldens the aggressor. The only language that has ever constrained Pakistan’s adventurism is the language of credible consequence. This is the time to speak it again.

Amitabh Mattoo, Dean, School of International Studies, JNU; and former Vice-Chancellor, University of Jammu

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